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Environmental discontent in the
“petrochemical kingdom”
The petrochemical industry, which consumes energy and water whileat the same time releasing massive amounts of toxic air, wastewater,and greenhouse gases, exacts a heavy environmental toll, particularly
in resource-poor and densely populated Taiwan. Its expansion has given rise
to widespread resistance, propelling the development of Taiwan’s environ-
mentalism. However, the existing literature in English gives scant attention
to this type of environmental grievance. It was a research topic for some
earlier dissertations, (1) and there have been attempts to understand the
local and religious dimension of anti-petrochemical protests. (2) A national-
level survey of its trajectory over the past three decades is long overdue.
Comparatively, the movement against nuclear energy seems to have gar-
nered more attention, presumably because its high political profile has re-
peatedly triggered intensive partisan struggles. (3) There are, however,
inherent limits to understanding the contour of Taiwan’s environmental pol-
itics exclusively through the lens of anti-nuclear protests. The nuclear con-
troversy has mainly concentrated on the ill-fated fourth nuclear power
plant, which was planned in the early 1980s and is still being constructed
amid increasing opposition. There has been no further expansion of nuclear
energy since then. Hence the dispute, for all its intensity and visibility, has
been largely contained in terms of the region and population directly af-
fected. Taiwan’s petrochemical industry, on the other hand, has undergone
steady up-grading and up-scaling in capacity since the advent of the mass
environmental movement. Geographically, it has also spanned different re-
gions as petrochemical producers constantly seek new sites (see Map 1).
Moreover, petrochemical development in Taiwan was often planned as a
mega-project involving large-scale land reclamation and the construction
of harbours and industrial complexes. While the fourth nuclear power plant
was heavily criticised for its inflated budget (NT$274 billion), it is dwarfed
by petrochemical projects (the Kuokuang project of 2008 was estimated to
require NT$620 billion in investment). With this in mind, this article takes
a close look at the historical evolution of popular reaction to petrochemical
pollution.
In terms of its natural endowments, Taiwan is not an ideal location to de-
velop a petrochemical industry. Not only is the island deficient in the pro-
duction of natural gas and petroleum, but its high population density also
aggravates the health consequences of pollution. Unforeseeable historical
contingencies, however, have turned out to be a more potent force than
geographical preconditions, transforming Taiwan into what economic offi-
cials like to call a “petrochemical kingdom” (shihua wangguo 石化王國).
In 1941, as the Japanese colonial government was preparing for the com-
ing Pacific War, a petroleum refinery was built in Kaohsiung (高雄) to service
the imperial fleet. The Sixth Navy Fuel Plant, then the second largest in Asia,
laid the foundations for the state-owned China Petroleum Corporation’s
(zhongguo shiyou gongsi 中國石油公司) Kaohsiung Refinery in the postwar
era. The United States advisors recommended a privately-owned plastic in-
dustry to stimulate economic growth, and American loans helped establish
the Formosa Plastics Group (tai su jituan 台塑集團) when it began manu-
facturing polyvinyl chloride in 1954. A joint investment by American Gulf
Oil and China Petroleum Corporation brought lubricant production to Tai-
wan in 1963.
The termination of American aid in 1965 made it necessary for Taiwan to
be more economically self-reliant. There was an ambitious state-sponsored
plan to produce upstream petrochemical materials for domestic consump-
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Resisting Naphtha Crackers
A historical survey of environmental politics in Taiwan
MING-SHO HO
ABSTRACT: Protests against naphtha crackers have been an important trend in Taiwan’s environmentalism since their emergence in
the mid-1980s. This article analyses ten protest cases (1987-2011) to understand the evolution of environmental politics. I draw the
following conclusions: (1) with the growing public awareness of pollution, new petrochemical projects are increasingly facing popular
opposition; (2) the environmental movement assumes less partisanship, although ideological differences between the political parties
still remain; (3) the mobilising capacity of NGOs is on the rise and has become the key factor in the success of protests.
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tion. China Petroleum Corporation built its naphtha cracker No. 1 (yi qing
一輕) (4) in 1968. During the “Ten Major Development Projects” (shi da jian-
she 十大建設) of the 1970s, the petrochemical industry was seen as a lynch-
pin critical to the nation’s industrial upgrading. China Petroleum
Corporation’s naphtha crackers No. 2 to 4 were subsequently built from
1975 to 1984.
In hindsight, Taiwan is a successful case of “backward integration” in that
the downstream textile and plastic industries, then the mid-stream chem-
ical fibre and chemical industries, and finally the upstream petrochemical
industry were sequentially established to form a well-linked and interna-
tionally competitive sector. (5) A nation’s petrochemical capacity is usually
measured by the volume of ethylene production, one of the main products
of naphtha cracking. By that index, Taiwan ranked number nine globally in
2010. (6) It is therefore no wonder that Taiwan’s petrochemical producers
proudly proclaim themselves “leading actors” in the creation of the “eco-
nomic miracle.” (7)
However, this overtly triumphant remark fails to take the environmental
cost into account. Prior to the mid-1980s, all of these petrochemical proj-
ects were launched with little popular opposition, as most people were ei-
ther unaware of pollution or afraid of voicing their dissent due to political
repression. As stressed by commentators, the year 1987 constituted a “wa-
tershed” in Taiwan’s environmental protection, (8) when the landscape for
the petrochemical industry was radically altered. In the past, petrochemical
producers used to claim that their investments were heartily welcomed by
host communities with dragon dance (wulong 舞龍) and lion dance (wushi
舞獅) performances; now, they are more likely to be avoided like a plague.
Following are the major socio-political changes since 1987:
First, the termination of martial-law rule in 1987 released pent-up griev-
ance against environmental degradation that sustained a strong wave of
anti-pollution activism. Local pollution victims organised NIMBY-style self-
help protests to demand immediate improvements or monetary compen-
sation. Middle-class professionals set up environmental NGOs, which
offered assistance to local protestors and advocated policy changes on a
national scale. (9) The first protest movement to oppose a new naphtha
cracker occurred in July 1987, two weeks after the government announced
the lifting of martial law. In addition, the Taiwan Environmental Protection
Union (taiwan huanjing baohu lianmeng 台灣環境保護聯盟), which used
to be Taiwan’s most influential environmental NGO, was founded in No-
vember of the same year. Together they constituted a broadly-based popular
front to resist further expansion of the petrochemical industry.
Secondly, in tandem with political liberalisation, Taiwan’s opposition coa-
lesced into the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986, in its challenge
to the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang (KMT). The opposition party
initially represented the native population, who chafed under the minority
rule of Mainlanders. However, as the KMT successfully built its broad social
basis, the political opposition had to organise itself as a catchall party, re-
cruiting “anti-KMT members from all social sectors.” (10) The rise of social
movements coincided with the DPP’s founding, which encouraged the latter
to ally with the protestors to form a united front against the KMT govern-
ment and gave the nascent opposition party a hue of leftwing progressive
politics. Witnessing the widespread rise of environmental grievances, DPP
activists joined anti-pollution protests, and their politicians championed
the need to put environmental protection ahead of economic development.
The involvement of a major opposition party politicised Taiwan’s nascent
environmentalism by giving it a vital role in party competition. (11) Before
its assumption of national power in 2000, the DPP consistently presented
a more pro-environmental profile than its KMT rival. However, during its in-
cumbency from 2000 to 2008, the DPP shifted towards a more pro-business
stance by shelving its erstwhile environmental commitments, thus severing
its previous political alliance with environmentalists. There are signs that
the DPP has adopted a more pro-environmental posture since losing na-
tional power in 2008. (12) As the following analysis will show, its attempt to
rebuild a coalition with environmentalists remains fraught with difficulties.
Finally, Taiwan’s Environmental Protection Administration was also formed
in August 1987, as the KMT government acknowledged the need to address
popular demand for better environmental quality. From the very beginning,
environmental officials adopted a technocratic approach to environmental
problems in the belief that disputes can be solved in a professional and po-
litically neutral manner. Upgrading administrative capacity and legislating
regulations were thought of as top priorities. Environmental impact assess-
ments, as codified in 1994, exemplified the rationalistic outlook of environ-
mental officials, because the scientific evaluation of development projects
by qualified experts was considered the best and most enlightened guideline
for policymakers. (13) However, the unintended consequence was that op-
ponents to petrochemical expansion used the review sessions to publicise
their scepticism, while officials and business representatives tried to down-
play the estimated harmful consequences, all of which severely damaged
the public credibility of environmental impact assessments. (14)
In short, with the emergence of the environmental movement, political
opposition, and environmental regulation, Taiwan’s petrochemical industry
entered a rocky terrain even though it still enjoyed state sponsorship under
both the KMT and DPP governments.
This article will analyse ten cases of naphtha cracker investments from
1987 to 2011 to understand the contours of environmental politics over
the past three decades. This inquiry is guided by the following questions:
What factors determine the outcome of anti-petrochemical protests? What
roles do stakeholders such as local residents, local governments, and NGOs
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play in these disputes? Over the years,
which actors have been gaining influence in
environmental decision-making? Since the
petrochemical industry contributed a signif-
icant share of pollution, an analysis of its
challengers helps us understand the trajec-
tory of Taiwan’s environmentalism. The re-
search data are primarily based on existing
research literature and journalistic reports.
Anti-naphtha cracker
movements in Taiwan
Taiwan’s first four naphtha crackers were
state-owned and were built without visible
opposition. As noted above, things took an
abrupt turn in 1987, with all six subsequent
naphtha-cracking projects arousing resist-
ance in varying degrees. They are (A) China
Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker
No. 5, (B) Formosa Plastics Group’s naphtha
cracker No. 6, (C) Tuntex’s naphtha cracker
No. 7, (D) China Petroleum Corporation’s
naphtha cracker No. 8, (E) China Petroleum
Corporation’s upgrading of naphtha cracker
No. 3, and (F) the Kuokuang petrochemical
project. Since three of them (B, D, and F)
shifted the sites selected for construction,
the six projects comprise a total of ten cases.
Among them, only three projects (A, B, and
E) finally went into operation, while the rest
were eventually abandoned.
As hinted above, Taiwan’s environmental-
ism was born in the crucible of political tran-
sition. The following analysis will look at the
unfolding of anti-naphtha cracker protests in three periods, 1987-1999,
2000-2007, and 2008-2011.
From liberalisation to power shift, 1987-1999
The 1987 lifting of martial law set forth a political liberalisation that al-
lowed environmental grievances to be expressed in street protests. In this
period, the political opposition and the environmental movement grew in
tandem. In 1987, China Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker No. 5 and
FP’s naphtha cracker No. 6 were the first two projects that incurred popular
resistance, followed by Tuntex’s naphtha cracker No. 7 in 1994 and China
Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker No. 8 in 1999.
China Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker No. 5 was planned to re-
place its No. 2, which went into operation in 1975; both were located in
Houchin (後勁), a former agricultural village situated on the edge of Kaoh-
siung City. However, the Japanese wartime decision to build a navy fuel
plant by requisitioning farmland and the post-war industrial expansion per-
manently changed the villagers’ fate. For more than 40 years, Houchin res-
idents suffered from toxic air and polluted groundwater, and their health
and crops were severely damaged. Taking heed of the relaxed political at-
mosphere, their rebellion erupted in July 1987, and unexpectedly, their bar-
ricading of one of the complex gates, a symbolic gesture of their rejection
of the new naphtha cracker, lasted for more than three years. (15)
The Houchin movement was one of the best-known environmental
protests in the post-martial law era, and its violence, including several
rounds of brutal confrontations with the police, revealed the magnitude of
long-silenced discontent. DPP politicians supported the protest, as its emer-
gence was widely perceived to be an indication of the KMT government’s
failure to protect the common people. In fact, one of the Houchin protest
leaders joined the DPP and won the legislative election in 1989.
In May 1990, there was a referendum in Houchin, in which 61% of those
who voted indicated their “determined opposition” while 39% were in
favour of “negotiation with China Petroleum Corporation.” Facing this en-
trenched opposition, the KMT government adopted a two-pronged strategy.
On the one hand, a fund of NT$1.5 billion was offered, and the interest
gained was used for a variety of good-neighbour compensations such as
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Map 1 – The above map shows the spatial location of the ten cases.
subsidised cooking gas and free school lunches. An official promise was
made to relocate the new naphtha cracker in 25 years. On the other hand,
the government mobilised police and security agents on a massive scale to
monitor protest leaders and suppress their activities. China Petroleum Cor-
poration subsequently began building the project in September 1990, and
it went into operation in 1994.
Formosa Plastics Group had long intended to operate its own naphtha-
cracking facility so as to end its dependence on the state-owned source.
Economic liberalisation in the mid-1980s finally convinced economic bu-
reaucrats to abandon the state monopoly on upstream production. How-
ever, Formosa Plastics Group’s ambition to build an integrated
petrochemical empire was thwarted by the rise of environmental protests
that obliged it to shift its projected site from Wuchieh (五結) Township, Yilan
County (B1), to Kuanyin (觀音) Township, Taoyuan County (B2), and even-
tually to Mailiao (麥寮) Township, Yunlin County (B3).
Yilan was Formosa Plastics Group’s preferred site, as the location was close
to a harbour facility. Local opposition was initiated in early 1987 by DPP
activists who later established the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union’s
Yilan branch. They closely collaborated with a nonpartisan county magis-
trate, Chen Ting-nan (陳定南) (1981-1989), who built up an incorruptible
and pro-environment reputation during his tenure. Chen had worked for
Formosa Plastics Group before launching his political career, and his elo-
quent and persuasive performance in a televised debate with the Formosa
Plastics Group president in December 1987 boosted the morale of the Yilan
environmentalists by gaining national support. As a result, the bruised For-
mosa Plastics Group turned its attention to Taoyuan, halting its Yilan plan.
In Yilan, local KMT politicians largely supported petrochemical investment,
so the dispute evolved into a partisan rivalry. In 1990, as Formosa Plastics
Group obtained the endorsement of the KMT central government, a second
offensive to build its naphtha cracker project in Yilan began. By then, Chen
Ting-nan had joined the DPP and been elected to the legislature. Chen again
led the protest movement, including a large-scale demonstration in Taipei
in December 1990. Moreover, Chen was succeeded by another DPP county
magistrate who was equally opposed to the petrochemical project. Thus,
the KMT central government was unable to repeat the same carrot-and-
stick strategy that it used to deal with the Houchin protest. In 1991, For-
mosa Plastics Group finally abandoned its dream of establishing a
petrochemical production centre in Yilan.
Yilan has been hailed as the “holy land of Taiwan’s democracy” because
non-KMT executives governed the county continuously from 1981 to 2004.
The victory over the powerful petrochemical conglomerate helped consol-
idate the DPP’s pro-environment credentials. After Chen, the DPP’s county
magistrates successfully promoted local culture and tourism, which were
presented as much more attractive alternatives to heavy industrialisation.
The “Yilan experience” became a political asset as the DPP sought to contest
the KMT for national power. (16)
By contrast, the Taoyuan location was persistently Formosa Plastics Group’s
number two choice. The company began to take interest in this alternative
only after its Yilan proposal became mired in local opposition. Starting in late
1987, Kuanyin residents established their self-help organisation to coordinate
protest activities, and they were joined by local DPP politicians and activists.
Meanwhile, KMT leaders were generally supportive of petrochemical invest-
ment. Compared to Yilan, the opposition party’s strength in Taoyuan was not
as well established, and that was one of the reasons why the Kuanyin move-
ment appeared weaker. Nevertheless, DPP politicians benefited from their
sponsorship of local environmental protest. In 1989, there were three major
elections for county magistrate, provincial assemblymen, and legislator. The
DPP candidates garnered 53.7% of the vote in Kuanyin Township, compared
with the county average of 35.0%. (17) Subsequently, Kuanyin became an
atypical DPP stronghold in the generally pro-KMT Taoyuan County.
The KMT central government did its best to facilitate the Formosa Plastics
Group’s investment in Taoyuan. The government granted a permit in July
1988, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ officials even tried to persuade
local opponents. Formosa Plastics Group ultimately decided to give up
Taoyuan for Yilan in 1990 because of higher land costs and the absence of
harbour facilities.
After the second setback in Yilan, Formosa Plastics Group followed the of-
ficial recommendation to consider Mailiao Township, Yunlin County, in
March 1991. Yunlin is located in Taiwan’s south-western agricultural heart-
land, and as farming income had been artificially repressed by the govern-
ment to speed up industrialisation, it remained one of Taiwan’s most
impoverished counties. Mailiao was an underdeveloped coastal township
with a high population outflow, making it easier for the pro-development
camp to frame the petrochemical industry as an opportunity for local pros-
perity. The Taiwan Environmental Protection Union’s Yunlin branch was set
up to oppose Formosa Plastics Group in an attempt to replicate the Yilan
experience, and most of its participants were DPP activists; however, the
DPP was much weaker, and the KMT county magistrate even managed to
mobilise a large-scale pro- Formosa Plastics Group rally in July 1991. In the
end, local environmentalists failed to garner sufficient support and were un-
able to forestall the petrochemical project.
At that time, Taiwan’s economic officials were eager to lure Formosa Plas-
tics Group to Mailiao for fear that the latter might divert its investment to
China. Consequently, naphtha cracker No. 6 was given a number of benefits
previously denied to private business. Formosa Plastics Group was allowed
to reclaim tidal land for its site and to own an industrial harbour, and the
government even built a huge water supply project primarily for its use.
Since naphtha cracker No. 6 went into operation in 1999, the government
has given the green light to its expansion several times. As a result, Formosa
Plastics Group’s Mailiao project grew to become the world’s biggest indus-
trial park specialising in petrochemicals, accounting for 75% of Taiwan’s
ethylene production and 18% of its carbon dioxide emission. (18)
Although the Formosa Plastics Group’s naphtha-cracking project did not
proceed smoothly in the beginning, there was a demonstration effect in that
the government was willing to sponsor a private venture in the upstream
petrochemical industry with privileges and subsidies. Tuntex (dongdishi 東帝
士), a textile and chemical fibre company that enjoyed good relations with
the KMT, joined hands with the Yieh Loong (燁隆) Group, a steel company,
to propose the Pinnan Industrial Zone (bin nan gongye qu 濱南工業區) proj-
ect in 1994, in which Tuntex planned to build naphtha cracker No. 7.
The Pinnan project was located in Chiku (七 股 ) Township, Tainan
County, (19) where a tidal lagoon nurtured oyster production and sheltered
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the endangered blackface spoonbills in their migratory route. This megapro-
ject’s plan to spend NT$470 billion to reclaim 3,500 hectares of land from
the lagoon immediately aroused the joint opposition of local fishermen and
oystermen as well as bird lovers. (20) Anti-dam activists in the inland area of
southern Taiwan also joined this campaign because the government was
attempting to develop new water sources. (21) Soon the movement leader-
ship fell to Su Huan-chih (蘇煥智), then an opposition legislator, who led a
long march throughout 22 townships in Tainan County over eight days to
mobilise the opposition in 1996. Learning from the lesson in Yilan, Tuntex
beefed up its public relation activities to build its local support base. Not
only were KMT politicians recruited into the pro-development camp as ex-
pected, but also DPP county magistrate Chen Tang-shan (陳唐山) (1994-
2001) came out in favour of this project. In 1997, as Chen was seeking his
re-election in the DPP primary, Su stood as a challenger and promised to
drop his bid as long as Chen publicly opposed the Pinnan Industrial Zone.
Thus, this controversy evolved into an internecine power struggle within
the DPP, and even its national leadership was unable to reconcile the local
conflict. Environmentalists complained about the decline of the DPP’s com-
mitment to environmental protection, claiming that “the DPP caused harm
to the movement against the anti-naphtha cracker No. 7” because many
people were asking “why the DPP opposed the naphtha cracker No. 5 and
No. 6, but not No. 7.” (22)
Luckily for opponents, environmental impact assessments were written
into law at the same time as the Pinnan project was proposed. It therefore
became the first major case to be reviewed under this new regulation. The
1994 law granted veto power to environmental officials in that major con-
struction projects cannot proceed without clearing the environmental im-
pact assessment process in the first place. Utilising this strategic space, the
Pinnan opponents raised a number of concerns, such as the ecological dam-
age caused by lagoon reclamation, the economic impact on local aquacul-
ture, and the deficient water supply. Facing these questions, the developers
had to spend time collecting research data to convince the official review-
ers. In the end, the government finally approved the Pinnan project in De-
cember 1999, just three months before the presidential election in which
the KMT lost national power. Although the timing was highly suspicious,
opponents did succeed in delaying this project as long as possible. By way
of comparison, Formosa Plastics Group spent four months and nine months
respectively in obtaining government permission for its Yilan and Taoyuan
plans, but the Tuntex Group was entangled in the environmental impact as-
sessment process for more than four years.
Things took an unexpected turn after the DPP became the ruling party in
2000. Firstly, Tuntex and the Yieh Loong Group were the type of businesses
that were able to expand swiftly because their political connections with
the KMT allowed them easy access to bank loans; they therefore suffered
financial setbacks when their political backers fell out of power. The Yieh
Loong Group was sold to state-owned China Steel in 2000, while Tuntex
was forced to declare insolvency the following year. Secondly, Su Huan-chih
was elected Tainan county magistrate in 2001, which made it practically
impossible to resuscitate the Pinnan project. In 2009, the Chiku lagoon was
designated part of Taijiang National Park (台江國家公園) and became fa-
mous for its eco-tourism.
In hindsight, China Petroleum Corporation appeared to win a pyrrhic vic-
tory at its naphtha cracker No. 5 because it had made a 25-year relocation
promise. Although the exact meaning of the official pledge was subject to
different interpretation, Houchin residents maintained the maximalist view
that the entire Kaohsiung Refinery, not just the ill-fated naphtha cracker,
should be gone by the end of 2015. In addition, China Petroleum Corpora-
tion’s rival Formosa Plastics Group had rapidly expanded its petrochemical
capacity since its naphtha cracker No. 6 was a greenfield project upon the
newly reclaimed land. Thus, soon after its naphtha cracker No. 5 went into
operation, China Petroleum Corporation began planning its replacement,
naphtha cracker No. 8, as well as other oil-refining facilities and private
midstream producers in Tashe (大社) and Jenwu (仁武) that relied on China
Petroleum Corporation’s supply. Two sites, Fangliao (枋寮) Township, Ping-
tung County (D1), and Putai (布袋) Township, Chiayi County (D2), were suc-
cessively proposed, but both ended in failure.
In March 1999, China Petroleum Corporation formally unveiled a plan to
build naphtha cracker No. 8 in Pingtung, on farmland owned by the state-
owned Taiwan Sugar Corporation. Upon hearing the news, the DPP County
Magistrate Su Chia-chuan (蘇嘉全) (1998-2005) immediately expressed his
disagreement, and his position was echoed by other DPP politicians. Although
Pingtung was predominantly agricultural, it suffered from air pollution emitted
from the heavy industries in the greater Kaohsiung metropolitan area. In ad-
dition, the mid-1990s witnessed a surge in local conservation movements
that helped raise environmental consciousness. Some of the activists entered
the local government during Su’s tenure, and thus facilitated the coordination
between the DPP and environmentalists. At that time, Su attempted to imi-
tate the Yilan model by promoting tourism so that high-pollution industries
were not welcome. Since high-pollution industries were unpopular in Ping-
tung, even the traditionally pro-development KMT politicians had to act cau-
tiously. In the 2001 magistrate election, the KMT candidate criticised Su’s
outright rejection of China Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker No. 8,
yet he refrained from endorsing the project explicitly.
In the latter half of 1999, China Petroleum Corporation diverted its atten-
tion to Chiayi for a brief period (see below), and made its second attempt
in Pingtung in 2002. As with the Formosa Plastics Group’s preference for
Yilan, China Petroleum Corporation considered Pingtung the best available
option. Su Chia-chuan remained adamant in his refusal, thus frustrating the
plan to build a new naphtha cracker. The Pingtung case was therefore unique
in that principled opposition from a local executive successfully prevented
petrochemical industrialisation despite little mobilisation of civil society.
The Chiayi episode of China Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker
No. 8 emerged largely as an effort to boost the KMT’s electoral campaign
for the 2000 presidential election, in which the ruling party faced a real
chance of losing power. (23) The then KMT vice-presidential candidate Vin-
cent Siew (蕭萬長) hailed from Chiayi, and since he had once led the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, which supervised the state-owned compa-
nies, his subordinate officials decided to bring naphtha cracker No. 8 to
Chiayi so that Siew could claim to have brought development to his
hometown.
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In August 1999, seven months before the presidential election, China Pe-
troleum Corporation abruptly announced plans to build naphtha cracker
No. 8 on the government’s abandoned salt fields. The Putai plan won the
immediate support of local KMT politicians, who controlled the local gov-
ernment. To welcome the project, Chiayi County government even broke
its previous agreement with a private developer and mobilised a mass rally
for “the construction ceremony.” Like Chiku, Putai was an aquaculture and
fishing centre whose main economic activities were easily threatened by
the encroachment of the petrochemical industry. A local opposition move-
ment emerged and received assistance from other environmental NGOs in
southern Taiwan; however, the opposition appeared weaker, as the pro-de-
velopment KMT politicians dominated local public opinion.
Even though the Putai plan was apparently part of the KMT’s campaign
tactics, the DPP camp did opt to choose the opposite stand. Some Putai
activists approached Chen Shui-bian, then the DPP presidential candidate,
but Chen declined to take a clear stand – obviously a strategic consideration
to accommodate the predominantly pro-development sentiment in Chiayi.
Nevertheless, the KMT’s setback in the 2000 presidential election sealed
the fate of the Putai plan. Once the DPP assumed power, China Petroleum
Corporation frankly acknowledged that the Putai site was not economically
feasible and turned its attention back to Pingtung. In 2001, the local exec-
utive position fell to the green camp as Chen Ming-wen (陳明文) became
county magistrate from 2002 to 2009. Following the example of Yilan and
Pingtung, Chen sought to promote smokestack-free development as an al-
ternative. Even though China Petroleum Corporation never seriously con-
sidered Putai as its construction site, local KMT politicians blamed the DPP
for losing the opportunity for industrialisation. Hence, as the 2004 county
magistrate election approached, the KMT camp even mobilised a campaign
to “bring back naphtha cracker No. 8.”
The DPP era, 2000-2007
The year 2000 witnessed Taiwan’s first regime change as the DPP won the
presidential election. The DPP had used to play the role of political ally to
the environmental movement. However, once it obtained national power,
its stance gravitated toward a more pro-development pole. In 2005, the
DPP government promoted China Petroleum Corporation’s upgrading of
naphtha cracker No. 3 as well as the Kuokuang petrochemical project.
The inability to establish a new production site forced China Petroleum
Corporation to consider other alternatives, such as expanding its existing
plant in Linyuan (林園) Township, Kaohsiung County, an idea first raised in
2004. Prior to the rise of the Formosa Plastics Group’s naphtha cracker
No. 6, Linyuan Industrial Park was Taiwan’s most important petrochemical
centre, and naphtha crackers No. 3 and No. 4 were located there. Due to
its earlier development, Linyuan was notorious for pollution. In 1988, a pol-
lution incident gave rise to a mass protest in which victims barricaded the
industrial park for three weeks, practically shutting down Taiwan’s petro-
chemical supply (the so-called Linyuan Incident). (24) Since Linyuan and
Houchin were both communities with a protracted history of environmental
suffering and anti-pollution resistance, expansion projects were certain to
meet local hostility.
China Petroleum Corporation’s original plan was to requisition 55 hectares
of private land for a new naphtha cracker at a total investment of NT$42.6
billion. In March 2005, the Linyuan township mayor led a protest against
this project, thereby initiating the local opposition movement. In the be-
ginning, local politicians of all stripes led the movement, but their involve-
ment subsequently declined for two reasons. First, China Petroleum Corpo-
ration decided to scale down the project by “upgrading” the existing
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Photo 1 – China Petroleum Corporation’s Naphtha Cracker
No. 3 in Linyuan Township. Taiwan’s petrochemical facilities
are often located in the vicinity of agricultural area. The pic-
ture shows a fishpond just outside the perimeter of the in-
dustrial complex. © Ming-sho Ho
Photo 2 – An anti-Kuokuang politician in Fangyuan Towns-
hip. The anti-Kuokuang movement succeeded partly because
of the strong local opposition to the project. This candidate
for a township-level election featured his anti-pollution
commitment during the campaign. © Ming-sho Ho
naphtha cracker No. 3 rather than “expanding” it, and abandoned the at-
tempt to enlarge its factory complex. Secondly, China Petroleum Corpora-
tion promised to offer more monetary compensations to the local
community. Consequently, by the time the project entered the official re-
view in 2007, politicians had shifted towards a more conciliatory stand, em-
phasising the need for “hometown prosperity.” Determined activists sought
the help of professional NGOs but found it increasingly difficult to mobilise
local participants after the defection of the political leadership. With the
conclusion of the environmental impact assessment review in December
2008, the opposition movement collapsed.
The Linyuan movement was conspicuously lacking in partisanship, quite
unlike the usual pattern of DPP involvement in anti-pollution activism. One
of the reasons was that the DPP’s Kaohsiung county magistrate, Yang Chiu-
hsing (楊秋興) (2002-2010), was in favour of the petrochemical investment,
which he eagerly solicited to demonstrate his economic performance. Re-
flecting the pro-business turn of the DPP central government, Yang had once
been an environmental activist, having co-founded the Taiwan Environmen-
tal Protection Union’s Kaohsiung branch in 1988 before standing for elec-
tion for the first time in 1991. During the Linyuan Incident of 1988, Yang
even led the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union members to join the
victims’ barricade. Yang’s metamorphosis from an environmental warrior to
a pro-development politician was generally in sync with the ideological drift
of the DPP during its incumbency. (25)
A scaled-down upgrading project was not enough to maintain petrochem-
ical production after the relocation deadline in 2015. Hence, with the DPP
government’s endorsement, China Petroleum Corporation launched a joint
investment with private business to form the Kuokuang Petrochemical
(guoguang shihua 國光石化) Company in January 2006, which first planned
a new naphtha cracker in Taihsi (台西) Township, Yunlin County (F1), and
then in Tacheng (大城) Township, Changhua County (F2). (26)
China Petroleum Corporation turned its attention to Yunlin in 2005, when
the Kyoto Protocol became effective. Since then, Taiwan’s environmental
NGOs had launched several protests against the DPP government’s support
for petrochemical expansion without regard for its impact upon climate
change. The first Kuokuang project was a massive investment of NT$401
billion to reclaim 1,800 hectares of the Taihsi seashore. Like its northern
neighbour, Mailiao, Taihsi was an impoverished and backward village. With
the mobilisation of the local KMT politicians, the Township Office was able
to carry out an opinion poll that showed 54% of the residents supporting
Kuokuang. Environmentalists were weakly organised in Yunlin, just as 15
years before, when Formosa Plastics Group decided to establish its naphtha
cracker No. 6 in Mailiao. The Taiwan Environmental Protection Union’s Yunlin
branch had long been moribund until its reorganisation in 2006, but even
revitalised it had only five active members who took part in the anti-
Kuokuang protest.
It looked as if the Kuokuang project was sure to be realised, given the en-
feebled state of the local opposition. However unanticipated developments
forestalled the plan. First, the DPP’s Su Chih-fen (蘇治芬) won the county
magistrate election in 2005, and she upheld an agriculture-first policy that
sought to restrain the growth of heavy industries. In particular, with the
colossal naphtha cracker No. 6 in mind, Su attempted to institutionalise
polluter compensation and to impose a county-specific carbon tax on in-
dustrial producers. Although both proposals failed to pass the KMT-con-
trolled county council, the Kuokuang management sensed the negative
change in the political wind. Secondly, the Taihsi project was mired in the
environmental impact assessment process. In March 2008, the Environmen-
tal Protection Administration determined that the case should proceed to
the second stage of review, which prompted Kuokuang to decamp to
Changhua County.
The return of the KMT, 2008-2011
The conservative KMT’s return to power coincided with the shift of the
Kuokuang site to Changhua. It was widely thought that the KMT’s pro-busi-
ness and pro-development ideology should have facilitated this mega-project. 
In Tacheng, the Kuokuang project initially received bipartisan support when
it was formally announced in June 2008, and its township office conse-
quently produced an opinion poll showing 98% in favour as if to outbid
Taihsi. KMT Changhua County Magistrate Cho Po-yuan (卓伯源) (2005-pre-
sent) saw Kuokuang as a credit to himself and vowed to facilitate its con-
struction. Additionally, the new KMT government led by Ma Ying-jeou since
May 2008 also supported this project, even though it was first proposed dur-
ing the DPP era. The new Kuokuang project grew to an estimated investment
of NT$620 billion and 2,900 hectares reclaimed from Tacheng wetland.
The second Kuokuang project nevertheless faced greater opposition.
Changhua environmentalists were better organised; for example, the Taiwan
Environmental Protection Union’s local branch had continued to play an
important role since its founding in 1988, unlike its counterpart in Yunlin.
Although few Tacheng residents joined the opposition, its northern neigh-
bour, Fangyuan (芳苑) Township, was a famous oyster production site with
previous environmental protest experience, and thus provided rank-and-file
protestors. Moreover, Changhua activists were able to secure assistance
from national NGOs such as the Society of Wilderness (huangye baohu
xiehui 荒野保護協會), Taiwan Rural Front (taiwan nongcun zhenxian 台灣農
村陣線), Taiwan Environmental Information Centre (huanjing zixun xiehui
環境資訊協會), and Youth Synergy Foundation (qing pingtai jijin hui 青平台
基金會), thus successfully placing this local environmental dispute under
the national spotlight.
By the summer of 2010, Taiwan’s mainstream media had begun publishing
reportage more sympathetic to the anti-Kuokuang movement. Literary writ-
ers (especially under the leadership of native poet Wu Sheng [吳晟]), college
professors, and medical doctors launched signature campaigns to defend
the precious wetland ecology. Similar to the role of the blackface spoonbill
in the case of naphtha cracker No. 7, anti-Kuokuang activists highlighted
the endangered Indo-Pacific humpbacked dolphins (bai haitun 白海豚),
whose habitat was about to be destroyed by the massive reclamation en-
gineering works. The universally beloved dolphins became oft-used figures
throughout the anti-Kuokuang mobilisation. Following the rise of public
scepticism, Weng Chin-chu (翁金珠), the former DPP county magistrate
(2002-2005), joined the opposition camp in September 2010. Weng’s con-
version was noteworthy in that she attempted to develop the Tacheng wet-
land and invited heavy industries there during her tenure, souring her
relations with local Taiwan Environmental Protection Union activists. Like
Yang Chiu-hsing in Kaohsiung County, Weng played an important role in or-
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ganising the Changhua chapter of the Taiwan Environmental Protection
Union in 1988, but she subsequently deviated from her environmental
stance to promote economic development. Weng’s about-face therefore
showed that once the appeal of environmental protection became main-
stream, it was possible to change the DPP’s position.
In early 2011, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, two heavyweight con-
tenders in the DPP primary for the presidential election, also jumped on the
anti-Kuokuang bandwagon. Su and Tsai served as premier and vice-premier
respectively when the Kuokuang project was first proposed in 2006. Clearly
as the anti-Kuokuang movement gained momentum, DPP politicians found
it expedient to follow the trend, even at the risk of appearing inconsistent.
With the DPP now in the opposition camp, the ruling KMT faced greater
political pressure. Since Ma Ying-jeou was facing his re-election challenge
within one year, he decided to abandon the Kuokuang project as a political
liability. In an emergency press conference in April 2011, Ma terminated the
controversial project and announced his support for wetland conservation.
The Kuokuang project was analogous to the Pinnan Industrial Zone in that
large-area reclamation would have resulted in irreversible damage to local
ecology and livelihoods. Nevertheless, Changhua activists secured their vic-
tory mostly on their own, as the DPP politicians were opportunistic late-
comers rather than initiators of the movement. Activists were particularly
successful in changing the initially bipartisan support for Kuokuang into bi-
partisan opposition, thus writing an unprecedented chapter in Taiwan’s en-
vironmentalism history.
The recipe for successful environmental
resistance
Robert Weller contends that the rise of Taiwan’s environmentalism in the
mid-1980s was no less than a process of “discovering nature,” since a new
awareness of pollution revolutionised many people’s everyday lives. (27) The
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Project Period Location
Civil-society 
mobilisation 
The DPP’s 
attitude
Protest 
outcome
(A) China Petroleum Corporation’s
naphtha cracker No. 5 
1987-1990
Houchin, 
Kaohsiung City
Strong Oppositional Failure
Wuchieh, 
Yilan County (B1)
Strong Oppositional Success
Kuanyin, 
Taoyuan County
(B2)
Medium Oppositional
Success due to
change of location
Mailiao,  
Yunlin County (B3) 
Weak Oppositional Failure
(C) Tuntex’s naphtha cracker No. 7 1994-2000
Chiku, 
Tainan County
Strong Divided Success
Fangliao, 
Pingtung County
(D1)  
Weak Oppositional Success
Putai, 
Chiayi County (D2) 
Weak
From neutral 
to oppositional
Success
(E) China Petroleum Corporation’s
upgrading of naphtha cracker No. 3 
2005-2008
Linyuan, 
Kaohsiung County
Medium Supportive Failure
Taihsi, 
Yunlin County (F1) 
Weak Supportive
Success due to
change of location
Tacheng, Changhua
County (F2) 
Strong
From supportive 
to oppositional
Success
Table 1 – Protests against naphtha-cracking projects in Taiwan (1987-2011)
The above table summarises the historical survey of these ten cases.
(B) Formosa Plastics Group’s naphtha
cracker No. 6
1987-1991
(D) China Petroleum Corporation’s
naphtha cracker No. 8 1999-2002
(F) Kuokuang petrochemical project  2005-2011
above survey confirms this observation in that every petrochemical industry
projects since then has met with varying degrees of local resistance that
lengthened the time between initial planning and execution. Moreover, site
selection became increasingly complicated as new projects were often
forced to seek alternative locations.
Among the six proposed projects, only three (A, B3, E) finally went into
operation. Two of them (A, E) involved brownfield redevelopment on land
already in use. The cases of Houchin and Linyuan indicate that the exis-
tence of petrochemical facilities tended to constrain popular mobilisation
because some local residents relied on them for livelihood. In addition,
good-neighbour compensation universalised in the 1990s brought about
closer ties between industrial producers and community elites, which fur-
ther reduced the likelihood that the latter would champion the rights of
pollution victims. Greenfield development appeared to encounter a
greater magnitude of resistance, since it involved massive social and eco-
logical change at the localities in question. Petrochemical producers there-
fore often chose the most backward areas for their development sites, not
only because of land prices, but also because less modernisation meant
less environmental awareness and weaker resistance. Mailiao (B3), Chiku
(C), Putai (D2), Taihsi (F1), and Tacheng (F2) are all impoverished seaside
communities. Incidentally, targeting poor greenfield sites in order to neu-
tralise the local opposition to hazardous facilities is also a common practice
by Japanese nuclear enegery developers. (28)
Over the years, the political influence of local executives was on the rise
and became a critical factor in successful resistance. In the Yilan movement
(B1), county magistrate Chen Ting-nan’s pro-environment stance helped
local mobilisation in defiance of the central government’s authoritarian de-
cision. In China Petroleum Corporation’s naphtha cracker No. 8 (D1), the
Pingtung county magistrate Su Chia-chuan’s announcement of his opposi-
tion even spared the need for local mobilisation from below. During Su Chih-
fen’s tenure as the Yunlin county magistrate, the local government was no
longer receptive to petrochemical industrialisation, which was one of the
reasons that Kuokuang decided to abandon its Taihsi plan (F2). The growing
influence of local government is also corroborated in a study on transport
construction. (29)
Alternatively, if local executives were not on the side of environmentalism,
stronger mobilisation was a necessary condition for a successful protest.
The Chiku case (C) offers a partial confirmation here since it was ultimately
the bankruptcy of developers that frustrated the project to develop the
Chiku lagoon. The anti-Kuokuang movement in Tacheng (F2) emerged vic-
torious because its activists were able to raise its national profile by securing
the support of outsiders. Once the anti-Kuokuang movement gained mo-
mentum, politicians had no choice but to jump on the pro-environment
bandwagon.
Thus, by discounting the cases in which developers were not entirely sat-
isfied with the proposed sites, such as B2 and D2, there are clearly two con-
ditions for successful resistance: principled opposition from local executives
and the strength of popular mobilisation.
From DPP Leadership to Movement
Autonomy
The DPP’s pro-environment profile faded significantly, especially during
its national incumbency from 2000 to 2008. (30) Committed environmental
activists held a prevailing view that the DPP and KMT differed little in terms
of social issues, and that the only meaningful political cleavage was in their
attitudes towards China. The above historical review offers a more nuanced
modification of this view.
Firstly, to be exact, it was not the experience of national governance that
pushed the DPP towards a pro-development orientation; its local executives
had been leaning in that direction prior to 2000, as evidenced by Chen Tang-
shan’s support for the Pinnan Industrial Zone. In fact, it seemed that pro-
moting hometown prosperity was such a strong motivation that some local
DPP politicians, such as Yang Chiu-hsing and Weng Chin-chu, were willing
to abandon their past environmentalism. The gradual rise of this pro-devel-
opment tendency clearly gained the upper hand over the pro-environment
Yilan model, which was more or less imitated in Pingtung, Chiayi, and Yunlin,
and thus paved the way for the DPP’s drift.
Even with the DPP’s new orientation, it is still too early to apply the “end
of ideologies” to contemporary Taiwan’s political spectrum. Although the
environmental movement has become less partisan in recent years, pro-
development mobilisation has not followed suit, since launching mass cam-
paigns for the petrochemical industry has been a common strategy by KMT
politicians. Particularly in Pingtung (D1) and Chiayi (D2), where the DPP was
hegemonic, the KMT challengers actually put more emphasis on industrial
development in order to highlight their different orientation. Moreover,
throughout the ten cases examined here, none of the KMT politicians sup-
ported the environmentalists when the opposition initially emerged. The
last-minute about-face by Ma Ying-jeou on the Kuokuang project (F2) was
largely a political expediency in reaction to the DPP’s earlier shift. Hence,
eight years out of power did not change the KMT’s fundamentally devel-
opmentalist outlook, nor was its entrenched relationship with the business
community altered. Therefore, ideological rivalry still plays a role in Taiwan’s
party politics. It is not surprising that environmentalists find it easier to per-
suade the DPP to support their cause than the KMT.
More importantly, Taiwan’s environmental movement weaned itself off
its earlier reliance on the DPP leadership because it learned how to obtain
trans-local resources. Before the mid-1990s, there were two patterns of
protest mobilisation: either movement was restricted to the afflicted com-
munity alone, as in Houchin (A) and Kuanyin (B1), or the Taiwan Environ-
mental Protection Union was the only channel for external support, as in
Yilan (B1) and Mailiao (B3). Since then, environmentalists have managed
to establish broader coalitions to fight petrochemical pollution. The Chiku
movement (C) practically became a common concern for all southern en-
vironmentalists. An upgrade from the regional to the national level occurred
in the anti-Kuokuang movement (F2), which actually succeeded based on
nationwide support. One source of enhanced movement autonomy comes
from the power of popular epidemiology. In recent years, a number of ac-
tivist scientists in leading universities have produced solid evidence that ex-
isting petrochemical factories have given rise to negative health impacts.
In 2010, Tsung Ben-jei (莊秉潔) of National Chung Hsing University mod-
elled the aerodynamic flow of fine particulate matters smaller than 2.5 mi-
crometers (PM2.5) if Kuokuang went into production and found that the
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project would shorten the life expectancy of the average citizen by 23 days.
Although his calculation was challenged by officials and the Kuokuang man-
agement, mass media amplified this message to the broader public and
helped the anti-Kuokuang movement. In 2012, Chan Chang-chuan (詹長
權) of National Taiwan University finished a three-year study sponsored by
the Yunlin County government that demonstrated a significant increase in
the incidence of cancer within ten kilometres of Formosa Plastics Group’s
naphtha cracker No. 6. In short, the movement capacity of Taiwan’s envi-
ronmentalism demonstrated considerable growth, thereby outweighing the
DPP factor in determining movement outcomes.
Conclusion
The petrochemical industry has an inherent tension with environmental
protection. Its insatiable hunger for land, water, and energy and its emission
of toxic wastewater and greenhouse gases has placed a heavy environmen-
tal burden on resource-poor and population-dense Taiwan. The petrochem-
ical industry underpinned rapid post-war economic growth while its
environmental costs were ignored by the authoritarian government. As soon
as political control was gradually relaxed, further expansion of the petro-
chemical industry inevitably incurred grassroots opposition, thus giving rise
to a strong current in Taiwan’s environmental movement.
This article looked at ten cases of naphtha cracker construction from 1987
to 2011 in order to understand the trajectory of Taiwan’s environmental pol-
itics. It is clear that petrochemical development became controversial and
contentious once people gained their political rights of speech, organisation,
and protest. Over the long haul, civil society gained strength and politicians’
leadership of the movement waned. The DPP’s pro-development turn has
significantly narrowed the political contrast between the two major parties
on environmental protection; however, ideological difference remain, as the
KMT remains committed to further petrochemical expansion.
My observation ends with the environmentalists’ victory in the Kuokuang
case in 2011, which was unique in many ways. For the first time, environ-
mentalists were eventually able to gain bipartisan support. It was all the
more remarkable because they had to mobilise without the leadership of
politicians. It remains to be seen whether the Kuokuang success can estab-
lish a national consensus and thus terminate the protracted warfare be-
tween environmentalists and the petrochemical industry.
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